Attack must be the basis of all air strategy since attack is the best form of defence
BEAUFORT THAT TORPEDOED A POCKET-BATTLESHIP. The R.A.F. co-operates in many ways with naval forces. It carries out continual reconnaissance of the seas around Great Britain and attacks enemy ships whenever they are found. This Bristol Beaufort torpedo-carrying bomber above scored a direct hit on a German pocket-battleship either the Lutzow or the Admiral Scheer, off the coast of Norway.
THE main purpose of an air force is to seek out and attack the enemy wherever he may be. Every lesson learned in the present war has confirmed this elementary principle. The use of air power in conjunction with land power as an indivisible whole, as the spearhead to, and cover for, land operations is a simple development of that idea. It follows, therefore, that attack must always be the basis of all air strategy for attack is also the best form of defence.
An air offensive, however, is not concerned only with attack against opposing forces in the same way as an army goes into battle against another army and a navy hopes to entice an opposing fleet to sea so that it can join combat and destroy it. There is a long arm to air power. It can reach “over the top” behind the enemy lines. Far more than with the other two services, it can “seek out” the enemy. Its targets can be, and are, anything and everything of importance to the enemy — his armament industries, his ports, his convoys, his road and rail communications and his reserves behind the actual fighting lines. Their relative importance as primary and secondary targets is the relative value which the enemy places upon them and the use he is making of them at the moment. At the height of the U-boat war, for instance, the whole weight of Britain’s Bomber Command offensive was turned to the destruction of U-boat bases and the centres at which submarine parts were manufactured.
But air warfare is double-edged, for the enemy in turn relies on his bomber forces to inflict serious damage to the vital centres of his opponent. Both sides, therefore, are obliged to allot a considerable proportion of their aircraft industry and flying personnel to the question of defence. They must produce fighter craft and train fighter pilots so as to render themselves as immune as possible from the attention of bombers, secure control of the air above their own production centres and be in a position to provide escorts for their own bombers in attack.
This situation of air superiority is not likely, though, ever to be complete over the whole of enemy territory. Even if superiority is obtained in a particular area of operations, it is probable that the enemy will still muster considerable fighter forces in his more distant areas with which to oppose long range bombers.
The main object of the Fighter Command of the R.A.F. is to defeat the enemy fighters in the air, but this is only possible within the radius of action of fighter aircraft and it is therefore necessary that bombers should have a fighting capacity which, allied with their powers of evasion by use of clouds or darkness, will enable them to operate alone in spite of probable heavy fighter opposition.
It is true to say that the bombers of the R.A.F., with the exception of the specialized American Flying Fortress, have a heavier defensive armament than those of any other country and this, coupled with the power-operated turrets used on most British types gives them a very high degree of immunity from attack. Nevertheless, bombers are always at a disadvantage unless accompanied by fighter escorts, and the R.A.F. are constantly developing new types of fighter aircraft and endeavouring to increase their radius of operation so that they can give their bombers the greatest possible support.
Let us now consider the qualities required by the various types of machines used in an air offensive. First of all come the bombers. These machines must have a long range, a high speed and a great load-carrying capacity. In addition they must have a powerful defensive fighting armament to give them as high a degree of immunity from enemy fighter aircraft as possible. They must have a high ceiling — i.e., they must be able to fly at a great height — so that they can keep clear of enemy ground defences on their journey to and from their objective. Britain has always designed her machines so that they would possess these qualities. They helped to bring about the success of the earlier Hampdens, Whitleys and Wellingtons and have made the giant four-engined Stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters the finest aircraft of their type in the world.
Fighter aeroplanes normally have a much shorter range than the bombers because they are designed primarily to intercept and bring enemy bombers to combat. They therefore require a very high speed, a very high service ceiling, and great engine power to enable them to climb rapidly. Single-seater fighters such as the famous Spitfires and Hurricanes, and the twin-engined Beaufighters and Mosquitos rely entirely on fixed guns or cannons firing forward.
Reconnaissance aircraft carry cameras and are usually without great offensive power. They rely chiefly upon speed or height to perform their task. Their duty is to obtain information and bring it safely home and they must, therefore, avoid combat wherever possible. They are not normally used for bombing, although they frequently carry bombs, and coastal reconnaissance planes may carry a torpedo.
ALLIED RAIDS ON OCCUPIED TERRITORY. This picture shows a Ventura aircraft of R.A.F. Bomber Command over its target, the Royal Dutch Blast Furnaces and Steel Works at Ijmuiden in Holland.
The effectiveness of all kinds of air operations is reduced by darkness. In daylight fighters can readily gain contact with enemy bombers, but at night the high-flying raider is very difficult to find and to attack. True, Britain’s night fighters have met with great success in establishing contact with the enemy, but given daylight there is little doubt that their “kills” would have been infinitely more.
To offset the advantage which darkness gives to the bombers is the fact that it is more difficult at night for bomber crews to identify their targets and attack them with accuracy. In general, effective air bombardment by night demands much higher skill in navigation and bomb aiming than do similar operations in daylight.
There have been many schools of thought regarding the use of fighters in co-operation with bombers. The ideal to be aimed at by an attacking air force is to send fighters on ahead of the bombers to clear the sky of opposing fighters before the bombers arrive over the target, thereby enabling the bombers to select and attack their targets at their leisure and unhampered by enemy interference.
Fighter Protection
Another school of thought takes the view that the bombers themselves should be so heavily armed as to be capable of beating off any enemy fighter attacks without assistance from their own fighters.
The Americans, in their design of the Flying Fortresses and the use they have made of them, have adopted this principle. These ideals, however, are unlikely to be attained by either of two air forces of nearly equal size unless one is very inferior in quality or morale.
One form of co-operation that can be adopted is for bomber formations to be accompanied by fighters whose duty it is to protect them whilst carrying out their mission. This method was tried by the German Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain in 1940 wherein their large bomber formations were escorted by still larger formations of fighters which attempted to keep the path clear, locally at any rate, whilst their bombers carried out attacks on the selected targets. It is a method of attack which has also been tried by Britain. The Germans failed with it, mainly because their fighters never succeeded in dealing properly with the opposition that they met and thereby allowed the British fighters to get in among the bomber formations. Britain has, at all times succeeded in using the method, because British fighters, technically superior, have always remained dominant. They have never allowed themselves to be broken up as formations.
It was the inability of the German fighters adequately to protect their bombers that caused the enemy high command to resort to night operations. This switch from day to night bombing, incidentally, followed the precedent which the Germans themselves set in the war of 1914-1918. It was an attempt to obtain from darkness and bad weather the cover for his bomber forces which his fighters had been unable to give him in daylight.
This expedient has, however, led to the rapid development of fighter operations by night which, in combination with an elaborate and highly technical system of radiolocation has succeeded in inflicting very heavy losses on the enemy.
Fighters can be and are used as bombers, but this is a specialized class of work for which British Hurricanes were adapted. The Germans use fighter bombers such as Me 109Fs and F.W.190s similarly and for tip-and-run raids on coastal towns. The fighter can use its great speed and manoeuvrability for purposes of evasion and it stands a better chance of penetrating enemy ground and air defences, but it has only a limited range and any extra weight it has to carry in the shape of bombs means that a corresponding weight of fuel must be sacrificed.
Efficient ground defences impose important limitations on offensive air operations. These defences consist of heavy and light anti-aircraft guns, balloon barrages and searchlights. Anti-aircraft fire is a serious danger to an aeroplane which flies at moderate heights and on a steady course.
Attacking planes are forced to take evasive action by altering course, height and speed whenever they encounter A.A. gunfire. This, of course, makes bomb aiming less accurate and, if heavy enough, almost impossible. In consequence, guns grouped round important targets have a strong deterrent effect. Light anti-air-craft fire is a valuable defence of small isolated targets.
Balloon barrages, especially at night or in very cloudy weather are a valuable deterrent to enemy raiders. They make enemy pilots extremely wary and keep the raiding machines at a height that will enable the A.A. guns to get at them and they, in consequence, very frequently succeed in bringing them down. In addition, they effectively stop low altitude bombing of towns and factories.
Lastly, searchlights not only very greatly help the ground gunners to locate aircraft by night, but their light dazzles the bomb-aimers and entirely upsets the accuracy of their aim.
The main object of British air strategy is attack, and the bomber is the chief weapon used to carry the fight to the enemy. We will now consider how the bomber is employed. The tactics of aerial bombing may be summed up as comprising: (1) accurate navigation to the target area, (2) prevention of enemy interference on the way, (3) recognition of the target, and (4) accurate bomb-aiming.
The first of these calls for considerable skill because the modern bomber must fly for hundreds of miles to reach its target, very often through clouds, fog or darkness. During its flight over enemy territory it will almost certainly be attacked either from the ground or by enemy fighters, but it must not turn back until it is severely damaged, or until it has accomplished its mission. Interference from enemy fighters whilst the bombers are going to or returning from their objective is overcome in different ways. In daylight or clear weather the bombers fly in close formation each relying on the air gunners of the whole formation to deal with enemy fighter attacks. The bomber formations adopted vary according to local requirements. Sometimes the aircraft fly in V formation, sometimes in box formation, or in diamond formation, but always with the aim of combining flexibility with mutual fire support, which is another most important factor.
Recognition of the target and accurate bomb-aiming are of outstanding importance. It is useless to have reached the target area if on arrival the target cannot be recognized or the bombs, when released, fall wide of the mark.
STUDYING THEIR TARGET. Accurate navigation to and recognition of the target are of outstanding importance in all bomber operations. These pilots and navigators are taking no chances: they are studying maps and photographs containing the latest available information concerning the objective which, in a few hours’ time, they will be blasting with high explosive bombs.
Targets can only be recognized after careful study of maps and photographs prior to the raid. In this respect the R.A.F. takes special pains to see that its pilots are given the fullest possible information, both photographic and otherwise before they set out to attack a target. In certain cases models of the target are made from photographic data and the best methods of approach and means of attack are discussed by the pilots before they embark on the enterprise.
Having identified the target, the next thing to do is to hit it with bombs. Good bomb aiming calls for a very high degree of skill, great determination, and coolness at the critical moment just before the bombs are released. Bombing has been carried out from heights up to 40,000 feet; it can be done from aircraft flying very low, or by dive bombing, in which the aircraft starts at a great height and dives at maximum speed upon the target, releasing its bombs at point-blank range and pulling out of the dive at the last possible moment.
High-level bombing is most effective in clear weather or when there are gaps in the clouds. It has the advantage that targets can easily be found, and the approach and bomb aiming are not interfered with too greatly by anti-aircraft fire. Bombs dropped from a great height have great penetrative power and accuracy. This method of bombing, however, rarely secures surprise, whereas very low bombing can secure surprise although approach to and recognition of land targets is made difficult by the speed at which the pilots pass over landmarks. Low bombing, too, exposes the aircraft to light anti-aircraft fire which in well-defended areas may be very effective. Bombs for low-altitude bombing are fitted with delayed-action fuses to enable the aircraft to get clear of the target before the explosion takes place. Blast can be very dangerous.
Dive Bombing
Dive bombing has been specially developed by the Germans. It gives considerable accuracy added to which the noise of the diving plane can add considerably to the moral effect of the bombing. On the other hand, if dive bombers are met by cool and well-aimed fire from the ground, very high casualties can be inflicted upon the attacking aircraft. The bombers after pulling out of their dives can also be caught easily by fighters. Dive bombing is therefore mainly effective against ill-defended ground targets or against ships when there is not sufficient protective cover by fighters.
Let us now consider the tactical employment of fighters in modern warfare. Fighter tactics are of two kinds, namely, fighters against fighters, and fighters against bombers. In addition small bodies of fighters may work on roving commissions such as shooting up enemy aerodromes or other special targets. Normally fighters operate in formations, so that a strong offensive fire can be brought to bear while at the same time the members of the formation protect each other and the whole from surprise.
In all circumstances height is of the greatest value in fighter attack. It enables advantage to be taken of cloud cover, and the direction of the sun, and also allows attacks to be made at great speed. Maximum performance at great heights is therefore a primary need in fighter aircraft. On occasion, when one body of fighters has encountered another, the V formations in which aircraft usually fly may be modified so that they fly round in .a defensive circle, each aircraft covering the one in front of him. All, or any can dive out of the circle to attack isolated enemies, or the whole circle can manoeuvre slowly until it withdraws from the combat. This formation was often adopted by the Germans during the Dunkirk period at the end of the Battle of France in 1940, and also in their later attacks in the Battle of Britain. The defensive circle formation was sometimes outwitted by British fighters getting inside the circle, flying round it in the opposite direction to the Germans, and thereby getting them one by one in their gun sights.
The volume of frontal fire of which the modern fighter is capable is very great indeed. Fighter actions, therefore, consist of considerable periods of manoeuvre for position with only short but intense bursts of actual firing.
Fighter attacks upon escorted bomber formations naturally depend in the first instance upon avoiding or dealing with any fighter escort. Once this has been done the method of attack upon bombers themselves is to split up the formation and then to deal with each member individually, several fighters attacking a single bomber from various directions and thus distracting the enemy air gunners from concentrating their fire.
Fighters that have to deal with the isolated bomber, which usually operates in bad visibility or clouds, have first to make contact with the bomber and then attack it before being observed. In these circumstances the work of the fighters might be described as “stalking”.
ENEMY SECRETS LAID BARE. The R.A.F. in its race to keep ahead of the enemy in technical development, maintains experimental stations where captured planes are dismantled and examined. Much valuable information has been obtained in this way, and the R.A.F. is not slow to incorporate or improve upon any useful devices it has discovered in enemy aircraft. The plane being examined is an Me 109 fighter.
In all fighter operations successful results can best be obtained when the fighters have a proper warning organization on the ground to assist them. Then, instead of spending unnecessary time in patrolling, they can wait on the aerodromes until warned of the approach of the enemy. When in the air they can be directed by radio to within sight of their quarry. The R.A.F. has brought to a fine art this co-operation between ground observers and fighter pilots, and this system contributed in large degree to the great successes achieved by British fighter pilots in the air battles over Britain in the autumn of 1940.
Besides the actual offensive and defensive duties carried out by bombers and fighters, planes of the R.A.F. co-operate in many ways with both land and sea forces. There are two main aspects of such co-operation; the first and most important of these is that there should be a favourable air situation before ships and armies can work successfully. If naval bases are subject to heavy air bombardment, if ships themselves whilst at sea are in constant danger of torpedo or bomb attack from the air, if the area in which they are working can be filled with mines dropped from aircraft, then naval forces have to work under a severe handicap and may have to face heavy losses. The same applies to the operation of military forces. The bases from which they receive their supplies of food and ammunition must be secure from air bombardment; the railways and roads along which their reinforcements and their daily needs are brought must be reasonably free from air attack. The troops themselves in their billets or camps must be able to get proper rest with total relaxation in the intervals of their fighting on the ground.
To ensure, therefore, that naval and land forces can operate effectively it is vital that a favourable air situation be produced by the air force to give them security from enemy aircraft, and to inflict upon the enemy those very difficulties which would prove embarrassing to its own ships and men. To obtain this favourable situation is part of the general air strategy of the war, and we must now consider how an air force achieves it.
Sea and Air Co-Operation
The first stage of air support for naval forces is air reconnaissance. This should provide warning when enemy ships are assembling or have put to sea, and thenceforward give an accurate picture of the enemy’s dispositions and the courses which he is steering in order that contact at sea can be made and a naval battle brought about. A classic example of this type of reconnaissance is the case of the German battleship Bismarck, which was reported by reconnaissance planes to have put to sea on May 25, 1941. As a result she was brought to action by naval forces in a battle in which the British battle cruiser Hood was sunk. Although the German ship succeeded in withdrawing from the action under cover of darkness, she was later located by Catalina flying boats of the Coastal Command and attacked by torpedo carriers of the Fleet Air Arm who succeeded in reducing her speed and summoning British naval forces. Her destruction on May 27 was no less a triumph for the air forces of Britain than for the Navy.
The second stage in close co-operation between air forces and the Navy is that air attacks should be delivered against enemy ships, synchronized with, or even prior to, a naval action. If important ships can be hit by torpedo or by bomb their speed and their effectiveness may be very seriously reduced, to the great advantage of naval forces in the subsequent operations. Here again the Bismarck affords a model example of this type of co-operation.
The detailed tactics of bombing ships at sea differ little from the bombing of targets on land except that a high degree of skill is required in judging the speed of movement of the target, and when low bombing, in pressing home the attack against a concentration of anti-aircraft fire. Torpedo attack by aircraft against ships requires the aircraft to descend very low and in close proximity to the enemy, and again calls for great judgment of speed and course to ensure a hit.
Aircraft can also co-operate very effectively by directing ships’ gunfire when the fleets are engaged. The Navy’s air requirements at sea are mostly met by aircraft in carriers and aircraft catapulted from warships. Effective support is also given, however, by shore bases reconnaissance, bombing and torpedo-carrying aircraft.
Land and Air Co-Operation
The question of the precise relationship between an air force and an army has been answered in many different ways since the war began, but experience has now shown, not only that an army is useless without supporting air power but that air and land forces must work together under one control if effective use is to be made of either. The air force must be at the tactical disposition of the army if any strategical land attack is to be carried through to a successful conclusion. It must be prepared to carry out perpetual reconnaissance, provide an air cover to keep enemy aircraft away and be ready at a moment’s notice to bomb targets which the army deem essential. When this war began, however, this conception of the relationship between air forces and armies was not fully understood. It took many months and the formation of a new Command, Army Co-operation, for it to become practice. Lessons learned in the Middle East had to be turned to account. The use of paratroops, gliders, fast fighters, such as the American Mustangs, had to be developed for army work.
A problem that has always faced the organizers of air forces is to decide between the relative merits of large numbers of aircraft as against a force of smaller size but of quality greatly exceeding that of the enemy. This question of quality applies not only to the design of the aeroplanes themselves, but to the material of which they are constructed, to the workmanship by which that material is put together, and to the training of the fighting crews.
It is always possible that a very large force used with great determination may overwhelm an opponent who has relied upon fewer numbers but greater quality, before he has recovered from the initial blows. This policy, however, entails very grave risks because of these initial blows should fail to destroy the enemy, the better aircraft and the more skilful crews can then assert themselves with the result that the force that relied upon numerical strength alone finds itself at a serious and increasing disadvantage.
The Royal Air Force has always endeavoured to supply its pilots with machines that are better than those of the enemy. Its policy has been to build the best possible machines that can be turned out quickly enough to supply all its requirements. Furthermore, it has always endeavoured to keep one jump ahead of the enemy in technical achievement. In order to do this it maintains experimental stations and keeps pace with the latest enemy developments by examining carefully all the latest types of enemy machines that have been captured. Much valuable information has been received in this way, and the R.A.F. is not slow to incorporate or improve upon any innovations or devices that have been discovered.
Aircraft viewed from the ground may appear as impersonal objects going about their business almost regardless of ordinary human factors. But they are not really so. Their pilots and crews are ordinary men subject to the enthusiasms, the faith or the misgivings of ordinary mortals. It is an essential condition of successful air warfare that the flying personnel have trust in their leaders, confidence in their own ability, and reliance on their aircraft and equipment. No other fighting forces are so susceptible to the encouragement that comes from success, or are so liable to discouragement from undeserved failure. The strategic and tactical handling of an air force, therefore, demands the most skilled direction. If an air force once gets the impression that its efforts are being wrongly or wantonly expended a vast amount of effort would be required to instil once more the courage and confidence which its task demands.
BRISTOL BEAUFIGHTER. This twin-engined day and night fighter has a span of 57 feet 10 inches; a length of 41 feet 4 inches, and its wing area is 503 square feet. The Bristol Beaufighter’s armament comprises four 20 m.m. cannon in the fuselage nose and six .303 inches m.g.s. in the wings. Four of these are mounted in the starboard wing and two in the port wing. It has a top speed of 330 m.p.h. and a cruising speed of 200 m.p.h. Mainly used by Coastal Command against enemy shipping.
